Now that SING! is over, I'm willing to take some time to analyze some of the events that happened during our numerous practices. One concept that seems to stick out to me when I think about SING! is that of social loafing. Social loafing occurs when individuals in a group exert less effort than they would if they were performing the task alone (Latane et al., 1979). For those of you who did not perform in or attend SING!, the Tri Delta routine involved groups of girls performing dance routines to various one-hit wonder songs of the past. One particular group was having a difficult time with a choreographed move and repetition was not improving their performance. Wisely, one of the dance leaders asked each girl to perform the move on her own. Almost instantly, each move was perfected upon her request. It seems that, by dancing in a group, each girl did not put forth as much effort into perfecting her dance moves as she would have with a solo dance. By requiring each girl to essentially perform a solo, the girls contributed a more appropriate amount of effort to the task of a synchronized dance. Our SING! performance also involved singing by members of the chapter who were not dancing during the skits. As usual, we were having trouble ensuring that everyone knew the lyrics and that each performer was singing at an appropriate volume. Once again, the girls were required to sing the songs individually. This seemed to remind the girls of how much they could contribute individually and our performance benefited from this. Although it was not a very popular move, singling out individuals to remind them not to engage in social loafing improved their output and our group benefited from the contributions made by each individual.
Latane, B., Williams, K., & Harkins, S. (1979). Many hands make light the work: The causes and consequences of social loafing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 822-832.
One thing I have learned in reading Paul Eckman's book "Emotions Revealed" is that people are driven by emotions. It's easy to see why; everywhere we go and everything we do involves some sort of emotional transaction. As inquisitive people, we want to know what elicits certain emotions and predict their occurrence in our daily lives. I've never heard of an animal that daydreamed, but ask anyone around you and they will confess that their mind occasionally wanders towards the imaginings of a different reality or of their future. If we all do it, then we're probably good at making these predictions, right? Wrong. It seems that when people make predictions about the impact of a future events on their emotional state, a process known as affective forecasting, these predictions often fall prey to the impact bias (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). The impact bias, also termed the durability bias, occurs when we fail to make appropriate predictions about the impact of major life events on our emotional conditions (Gilbert et al., 1998). Social psychologists have found two possible reasons for the possible biases in affective forecasting. For one thing, when we contemplate hypothetical negative events, we fail to appropriately estimate the extent to which we effectively cope with the adversity we are experiencing. This is good news for coping, but underestimations of effective coping can lead us to incorrectly predict our future happiness (Gilbert et al., 1998). Furthermore, it is thought that "tunnel vision" biases our affective forecasting as well. When contemplating the future, we tend to fail to consider all aspects of our lives that contribute to the emotion we are attempting to predict. Thus, when asked to predict how happy a pay raise would make us, we fail to consider other factors (i.e., close relationships, economic crisis, etc.) that have an emotional impact on our lives.
After learning about the tendencies of affective forecasting, I was startled to realize the number of times I have fallen prey to the impact bias. Knowing that I am not alone in my ability to inappropriately forecast, I set out to document my friends doing just that. After reading about studies conducted by social psychologist Daniel Gilbert and others, I created a list of eight scenarios and asked people (a) to identify the emotion they would feel, (b) the extent to which they would feel it by rating the emotional impact on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest), and (c) how long they would feel the predicted emotion. As you can hear in the videos, the following scenarios are presented:
The candidate you supported won the presidential election.
The candidate you supported lost the presidential election.
You win one million dollars by playing the lottery.
A close friend passes away.
You have just graduated from high school and are offered a scholarship that will allow you to attend the college of your dreams.
Your favorite pet runs away from home and you cannot find it.
You save up and finally buy your "dream car."
Due to the economic crisis, you are forced to take a job that you are overqualified for and do not enjoy.
I chose these scenarios after thinking about events that have either recently transpired or are likely to occur in the lives of the people around me. It is known that, for most negative life events (every other question asked), even the most negative occurrences affect us for a period of no more than three months. In predicting future happiness after an election, voters with winning and losing candidates showed no differences in happiness levels one month post-election. The temporal effects of life events on emotional wellfare have been replicated in countless studies.
Although we often fall prey to the impact bias, it can be avoided. As Wilson et al. (2000) noted, when students were reminded of their daily activities before making predictions, the bias disappeared. By reminding ourselves of all the events that contribute to our future emotions, we become more rational forecasters and make better predictions. This can be seen in my final interview of a former social psychology student who was able to make appropriate predictions, armed with her knowledge of the impact bias. Although I documented my non-social psychology friends making this error countless times, I was careful to inform them of the concept after each interview in hopes of helping them to make better predictions about their futures. Each person was able to realize that they had greatly overestimated the impact of the scenarios I presented and adjusted their estimations to be more accurate. It is my hope that, when appropriate reminders are present, we will all be able to make better predictions and thus avoid disappointment and unrealistic expectations.
Eckman, Paul. (2007). Emotions revealed: Recognizing faces and feelings to improve communication and emotional life. New York: Holt.
Gilbert, D. T., Pinel, E. C., Wilson, T. D., Blumberg, S. J., & Wheatley, T. (1998). Immune neglect: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 617-638.
Wilson, T. D., Wheatley, T., Meyers, J. M., Gilbert, D. T., & Axsom, D. (2000). Focalism: A source of durability bias in affective forecasting. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78, 821-836.
Wilson, T. D. & Gilbert, D. T. (2003). Affective forecasting. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 35, 345-411.
Wilson, T. D., & Gilbert, D. T. (2005). Affective forecasting: Knowing what to want. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 131-134.
The norm of reciprocity can be found everywhere; the Bible preaches the "golden rule" of treating others as you would wish them to treat you, some cultures are driven by the "eye for an eye" mentality, and many people operate on a system of "paybacks." Whether the results of reciprocity are positive or negative, this need to repay others has a great impact on social interactions (Gouldner, 1960).
Fortunately, most of my social interactions involving reciprocity are positive. One of my best friends at Southwestern and I met three years ago when we lived next door to one another in our dorm. We have spent countless hours together and, often, one of us forgets our wallet when we go to eat or shop. Without hesitation, the other always says, "Oh, don't worry about it. I'll just take care of it." Although we've never kept a running tab and certainly don't expect the other person to return the favor (we often forget when who payed for what), the other person always seems to happily provide for the other due to recollections of past reciprocity.
At the end of this summer, my life seemed to fall apart. My boyfriend and I broke up and my 19 year-old parrot (essentially a sibling for an only-child like myself) died within a 24-hour time period. While I don't consider myself to be someone who mopes around all day, I was devastated and could not function. My roommate and another one of my best friends quietly stepped in and made sure that I managed to put one foot in front of the other. When I stopped eating, she made me bake with her. When all I could do was think about what was lost, she made me craft and create things with her. When all I could do was cry, she wiped away my tear and read Dr. Seuss' 'Oh, the places you'll go!' As mushy and sentimental as this sounds, it's the truth. My friend gave me the loving care that helped me pull through the situation. Unlike paying for a meal at Chipotle when I don't have my wallet, the kindness my friend showed me has been difficult to reciprocate due to the immensity of what she did. I bought her flowers, made her cards, baked countless goodies for her sweettooth, and crafted for her, all to no avail. Finally, I admitted a seeming defeat in that I could not immediately reciprocate the magnitude of care that she had given me. Although I'm still trying to make up for a debt I feel I owe, I simply have to remember that, as unfortunate as it will be, she will inevitably need me to treat her as she has treated me and I will then be able to give her what she gave me so selflessly.
Gouldner, A. W. (1960). The norm of reciprocity: A preliminary statement. American Sociological Review, 25, 161-178.
Leon Festinger (1957) proposed the cognitive dissonance theory in an attempt to describe why people behave in ways that are inconsistent with their attitudes. According to Festinger, people are extremely motivated to maintain a state of mind that consists of compatible attitudes, behaviors, and beliefs. This state of mind is known as cognitive consistency (Abelson et al., 1968). When cognitive dissonance (contradictory or inconsistent cognition) occurs, people experience tension from this and work to reduce their discomfort, sometimes in irrational and maladaptive ways (Festinger, 1957).
I consider myself to be a dedicated student. I worked hard through high school and feel like I have continued to do so in college. I am committed to multiple organizations and jobs in addition to academics. After the initial shock I experienced my fist year at Southwestern, I resigned myself to the idea of dedicating a large part of my weekends (and free time in general) to both school and work. This semester, I have discovered that in order for me to sleep at all during the coming week, I must allot a significant amount of time to homework over the weekend. This weekend, however, was my 21st birthday. I committed myself to plans, spent time with family and friends, cancelled work committments, and gave myself plenty of time to sleep. This decision, as wonderful as it was at the time, has certainly put a lot of strain on this week. With multiple assignments, countless readings, and a few tests thrown in the mix, I'm having a typically hectic week at Southwestern. My behavior this past weekend is definitely inconsistent with my attitudes toward school and I was fully aware of the consequences of my actions. This has caused me to experience cognitive dissonance. In order to reduce this dissonance, I have worked to minimize the importance of the conflict by telling myself, countless times, that I would much rather remember the fun times I had on my 21st birthday than the time I spent doing the homework I should have done. Although my attitude toward school in general has not changed, I have reduced my experienced dissonance by justifying my action.
Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H. (1968). Theories of cognitive consistency: A sourcebook. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Persuasion (attempts to change an attitude) can be found everywhere. People think about a persuasive message by taking either a central route to persuasion, a critical and logical approach to the contents of a persuasive message, or by taking a peripheral route to persuasion, an approach that focuses on the superficial content of a persuasive message (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). The type of persuasive message and the content it conveys is often telling of the audience the message targets. Often, messages use fear to persuade their audience. Specifically, numerous political messages utilize the Terror Management Theory(the theory that humans are terrified of their inevitable mortality and cope with this fear by constructing views that preserve their self-esteem) to target our need for self-preservation (Greenberg et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 2002). When reminded of the terrifying fact of mortality, people attempt to decrease their anxiety by rallying around their leaders (Landau et al., 2004). Gallup polls show that when the US government issues terror warnings, presidential approval ratings increase (Willer, 2004).
Over fall break, I travelled to Colorado with my roommates. Due to Braden and Jenny's generous early birthday present of a plane ticket, we were all able to fly to and from Colorado, and thus spent some time in the Denver and Austin international airports. As we trekked across large expanses of carpet and tile, searching for our gate, it struck me as odd that the the overhead speakers constantly reminded us that, according to the Homeland Security Advisory System, we were at the orange level of high risk of terrorist attacks. These messages were accompanied by reminders to do our "patriotic duty" and alert airport security of any suspicious behavior we observed. While there were no sirens or flashing lights of alert, I found these messages to increase my anxiety. This heightened anxiety certainly did not prevent me from travelling, but it did lead me to wonder what had brought about the predicted high risk of terrorist attack. In light of fear tactics of persuasion, these warnings make more sense. With the upcoming elections and constant criticism of President George W. Bush, it would certainly be strategic of both the current administration and the campaigning republican party to convey fear-based messages of the probability of terrorist attacks. Although my personal approval of the current administration did not improve, I did notice my slightly heightened anxiety due to a reminder of my own mortality. I can see how the average American, unaware of such techniques, could be swayed by a timely persuasive application of the Terror Management Theory and the findings of Willer (2004).
Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and cultural worldviews: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 61-139. Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, E., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Miller, C. H., Ogilvie, D. M., & Cook, A. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminderrs of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 116-1150.
Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and persuasion: Central and peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Guilford.
Pyszczynski, T. A., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2002). In the wake of 9/11: The psychology of terror. Washington, DC:American Psychological Association.
Willer, R. (2004). The effects of government-issued terror warnings on presidential approval ratings. Current Research in Social Psychology, 10, 1-12.
As the presidential election draws closer, it seems that more and more people are expressing their attitudes regarding candidates and issues. This is certainly true of my social circles. Although I feel that I can guess, with decent accuracy, the political views of my friends, there are times when I find myself under the wrong assumption and left holding confusion's hand. Unfortunately, this was the case with one of my closest friends and his attitude towards John McCain.
My friend is someone whom I would consider open-minded and accepting. He attends a liberal university, spends the majority of his time with liberal friends, and generally disagrees with conservative views (when not explicitly noted as conservative). Months ago, when we began discussing the presidential candidates, I was shocked to hear that my friend intended to vote for John McCain. "That makes no sense!" I recall myself saying. I was disheartened and confused by his voting selection. However, in light of the theory of planned behavior, my friend's prediction of his action this November makes more sense.
Thetheory of planned behavior reasons that my friend's behavior is influenced by his intentions. According to this theory, my friend's intentions are influenced by his attitude toward a specific behavior, the extent to which he feels in control of his behavior, and his beliefs about what others think he should do (also known as subjective norms) (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, in the case of my friend, multiple factors contribute to his intention to vote for John McCain. My friend feels that participation in the electoral process is somewhat futile and that either candidate will do things in office with which my friend does not agree. This negative attitude toward voting has led my friend to be less interested in the campaigns of both parties and less likely to actively investigate the platforms of both candidates. My friend is registered to vote and knows that he has easy access to facilities where he can do so, therefore feeling in control of the behavior of voting for McCain. In my opinion, the greatest contributors to my friend's intent to vote are found in subjective norms. My friend's family is very conservative, politically active and powerful in his hometown, and controls a large amount of wealth that they are obviously interested in protecting. Although my friend does not actively participate in his family's local politics, his family certainly influence him to be more conservative by modeling such behaviors. It seems that his general disinterest and disdain have left him siding with his most reliable source of information and support - his family.
While the theory of planned behavior stresses that intentions doe not completely determine behavior, it seems likely that the influence of perceived control of personal behavior, subjective norms, and opinions about the behavior will lead my friend to vote for McCain, despite his own personal liberalism.
Ajzen, I. (1991). The theory of planned behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 50, 179-211.
Stereotypes consist of general beliefs about the characteristics of members of a group and seem to be a fact of daily life; they are presented and reinforced by the media, language, and many other factors (Ward et al., 2005; Ward & Friedman, 2006). Some stereotypes are so strongly associated with certain groups that they function at an unconscious or implicit level. Implicit stereotypes influence preferences, beliefs, and actions often without being detected.
In an attempt to better understand implicit stereotypes and unconscious preferences and beliefs in general, the Implicit Associates Test (IAT) was created (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Although there are numerous topics addressed by different IATs, each test uses the same general method to come to conclusions about personal preferences and beliefs of which the subjects are unconsciously aware and/or unwilling to acknowledge. During an IAT, the participant is instructed to pair two concepts (e.g., disability and good, ability and good) as rapidly as possible. According to theory, it is easier to respond more rapidly to more strongly associated concepts. Thus, when the participant has a strong association for a specific pairing, their responses will be more rapid for pairings that favor their pairing association.
In an effort to explore my own implicit stereotypes, I took the Abled - Disabled IAT. The test results were consistent with my conscious beliefs and attitudes and even a little surprising. According to this IAT, I display a moderate preference for Diasbled Persons compared to Abled Persons. I was specifically interested in this test because I currently mentor Morgan, an 18-year old girl with Autism and easily-observable disabilities. My work with Morgan has further kindled an interest of mine in working with children and young adults with various disabilities. After reading about IATs and the often-surprising results they report, I was somewhat nervous to take the test in fear of discovering a preference for persons without disabilties. If anything, I expected the test to report little or no preference for either group and hoped I would not display a strong preference for Abled Persons.
I think the result of this IAT is consistent with my conscious beliefs and attitudes and reflects my "true" attitude regarding disability. When I took this test, I was under the assumption that I would display ingroup favoritism, a tendency to prefer groups with which I readily identify (Capozza & Brown, 2000). I do not personally identify with persons with disabilities because I have not been classified as disabled and assumed I would thus favor the Abled Persons category. However, it seems that by interacting with persons with disabilities, such as Morgan, my ingroup favoritism has decreased. According to Alport's contact hypothesis, my direct interactions with Morgan and other persons with disabilities has reduced my ingroup favoritism (Allport, 1954). It has also been noted that outgroup prejudice (prejudice towards people not belonging to an ingroup) is less intense for members of majority groups because they do not feel threatened by a minority status (Brewer & Pickett, 1999; Brewer, 2003). It is also thought that, when motivated, people are less likely to display ingroup favoritism (Sherif et al., 1961). Because I am paid to work with Morgan and I see this opportunity as one that will influence my future education and career, I am motivated not to see persons with disabilities as anything other than individuals. By viewing Morgan as an individual, I no longer classify her in predominantly stereotypical ways and reduce my ingroup favoritism.
I returned to the Abled - Disabled IAT and retested myself, attempting to increase the speed with which I responded to the items presented. Because I was more familiar with the test I felt I could attempt to speed up my responses a little more and that the increase in speed might give a more representative data set. Any actual increase in speed was marginal. Interestingly, my results suggested little or no automatic preference between Abled Persons and Disabled Persons. This is more in line with my initial predictions for an absence of preference for either group and failed to report ingroup favoritism on my part. The IAT seems an effective means of measuring general associations, but should not be taken as the "be all, end all" of associative measures. There are many factors that contribute to complex concepts of prejudice, stereotypes, and associations in general that cannot be fully encompassed by one test such as this. The main importance of the IAT, in my opinion, is that it serves as a tool to encourage participants to think about their implicit associations and to encourage further education and awareness of such issues. As in my case, exposure to outgroups and motivation to not exhibit ingroup favoritism can decrease negative associations.
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Brewer, M. B. (2003). Optimal distinctiveness, social identity, and the self. In M. R. Leary & J. P. Tangney (eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 480-491). New York: Guilford.
Brewer, M. B., & Pickett, C. L. (1999). Distinctiveness motives as a source of the social self. In T. R. Tyler & R. M. Kramer (Eds.), The psychology of the social self: Applied social research (pp. 71-87). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Capozza, D., & Brown, R. (2000). Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research. London: Sage.
Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: Attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. Psychological Review, 102, 4-27.
Sherif, M., Harvey, L. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). The Robbers Cave experiment: Intergroup conflict and cooperation. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press. (Reprinted in 1988)
Ward, M. L., & friedman, K. (2006). Using TV as a guide: Associations between television viewing and adolescents' sexual attitudes and behavior. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 16, 133-156.
Ward, M. L., Hansbrough, E., & Walker, E. (2005). Contributions of music video exposure to black adolescents' gender and sexual schemas. Journal of Adolescent Research, 20, 143-166.
